

НЕЙТРАЛІТЕТ ЯК СТРАТЕГІЯ НАЦІОНАЛЬНОЇ БЕЗПЕКИ

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Досліджено нейтралітет як один з основних державних стратегій. Проаналізовано основні теоретичні та методологічні підходи дослідження проблеми нейтралітету, вивчено різноманітні дефініції цього поняття та виявлено основні ознаки нейтралітету держави.

Досліджено історичну еволюцію становлення стратегії нейтралітету у міжнародних відносинах. Виокремлено погляди зарубіжних та вітчизняних вчених на стратегію нейтралітету держави. Визначено основні держави, що дотримуються політики нейтралітету, а також Україна, яка колись дотримувалась цієї стратегії.

Ключові слова: Україна, нейтралітет, неприєднання, безпека, глобалізація, авторитет

NEUTRALITY AS A STRATEGY OF NATIONAL SECURITY

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The complex study of the state neutrality strategy is done. The theoretical and methodological basis of neutrality strategy is analyzed, the problem of definition this phenomenon is investigated, the main aspects of neutrality strategy tendencies are clarified.

When Ukraine gained independence after the dissolution of the USSR, the new country declared an intention to become a permanently neutral state that does not participate in military blocs. The concepts of neutrality have been considered an effective means of pursuing foreign policy and ensuring a national security of the new state. This research undertakes an investigation of the transformation of the concept of neutrality under the conditions of the dynamic process of globalization in the modern international relations. It aims to examine the changes in the priorities in the foreign policy of the states that declared a permanently neutral and non-aligned status. The methods are used to identify scholarly theories that view neutrality as a security strategy.

It was pointed out that neutrality as a security strategy had become most significant, during the Cold War. In this respect, the end of bipolarity brought uncertainty and ambivalence in the perception of the notion of neutrality. On the one hand, the rationale for neutrality in the age of globalization seemed to disappear; on the other hand, the neutral states had increased their activities in new areas and become newly involved in international politics. The hypothesis of the thesis was that neutrality remained to be an effective tool in the conceptual formation and implementation of the foreign policy of the states under the conditions of the dynamic development of the modern international relations. However, it was pointed out that the success of neutrality depended on a state's ability to maintain a credibility of the very status, taking into account a geopolitical location of the state and a positive perception of such a status by the potential belligerents, alliances, blocs, and the leading actors of the international relations, on the whole.

Neutrality as a status of the state that resists participation in war actions with the other states remains to be a vital concept in the international politics. Its evolution under the conditions of the bipolar system of international relations led to the emergence of the politics of non-alignment, which is considered unilaterally declared status that does not necessarily need to be internationally-legally stipulated and that provides a state with somewhat broader space for action, only via limiting its participation in military blocs. Furthermore, with the emergence of new sectors of security and homogeneity of the world in the age of globalization, the concept of neutrality did not lose its meaning. The European neutrals proved that in the conditions of the formation of the multipolar system of international relations and the new system of European security, neutrality may become one of the indispensable elements for their proper functioning.

Key words: Ukraine, neutrality, non-alignment, security, globalization, credibility

Si vis pacem, para bellum
If you wish for peace, prepare for war

The modern system of international relations has faced urgency of the comprehension of the concrete tasks, as regards the elaboration of the qualitatively new mechanisms of national security. A number of European states, concerning problems of national security, have addressed to the concept of neutrality as the major means to solve the dispute.

Finland, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden, Ireland belong to this group of states, which is assumed to be called the classic European neutrals. All of them, except Switzerland, are the member states of the European Union (henceforward the EU), but concerning national security, they look for neutrality as the solution of the problems of their secured existence. Noteworthy, each of the aforementioned states has gone through own path towards the use of neutrality as the main concept of their foreign policy.

The processes of shaping the multipolar, pluralistic world stipulate the evolution of the concept of neutrality and, as a result, led to the appearance of new non-traditional patterns of the politics of neutrality. Nowadays, neutrality acquires many different forms, namely legal, political, security, economic, cultural, etc.

So, the research problem is the determination of the main aspects of the transformation of the institute of neutrality under the conditions of globalization, which still lacks an appropriate explanation in political science.

The problem of determination of the transformation of the concept of neutrality under the conditions of globalization still remains to be one of the least researched problems in the European and Ukrainian home science.

However, there were certain attempts to analyze the concept of neutrality and its practical implementation made by the representatives of different disciplines in international relations. Existing publications deal with the certain aspects of neutrality and its adaptation to the challenges of the modern era. Among them we can distinguish the works of H. Ojanen, G. Herolf, R. Lindahl, R. Jervis, S.Walt, E. Karsh, K. Waltz, S. Subedi, H. Neuhold, L.Mates, H. Hveem, P. Willets, C. Kegley, E. Wittkopf, M. Doyle, B. Buzan, O.Wæver, J. Wilde and etc.

Within the field of international relations, neutrality as a security strategy is approached and described in a number of different ways. The major schools of thought maintain opposing approaches to the advantages and disadvantages of a neutrality posture, dividing scholars into neutrality (traditionalists) realists and neutrality constructivists.

Neutrality realists see the world as a jungle [Michael 1997: 18] in which every state has always to prepare for war and balance power against enemies,

usually through joining convenient alliances. Realists characterize neutral countries as “dependent variables” that are trying to respond to external threats and pressures that they can neither influence nor control individually. Therefore, the realists view neutrality as a necessity for survival rather than a virtue.

In contrast, neutrality constructivists have altered the traditional concept of threat in international relations. Traditionally, the primary agent of security studies was the state. According to the constructivists, it has been joined by other agents: different non-state groups and even individuals. Therefore, the constructivists view neutrality as a means of the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining process of the political sphere.

Our study proceeds methodologically at different levels. In general, we base in the discourse-historical approach which leads to a rational solution of problems and significantly contributes to the fulfillment of the aim and the objectives of the research. Within the framework of the discourse-historical approach, debates in the media and political speeches are widely studied; on the other hand, participant observation, involving a range of methods, in particular: direct observation and analysis of documents is installed as another type of research strategy in order to obtain more detailed and accurate information about the studied phenomenon.

Neutrality as a phenomenon of the international relations appears to be a result of social relations within the world community. There are in reality many interpretations and variations of this phenomenon, and the neutral or formerly neutral countries themselves use the term “neutral” in different ways, sometimes interchangeably with the equally multifarious term “non-aligned.” [Ojanen, Herolf & Lindahl 2000: 10].

Nevertheless, the origins of the word “neutrality” can be traced back to the times of Antiquity, where the notion of neutrality took shape into the legal institutions and gained a new concept [Bederman 2001: 220]. Hence, the word “neutrality” is derived from Latin neuter, which means neither of two.

Legally, neutrality is defined as a status of the state that resists participation in war actions with the other states. This status goes with certain rights and duties, and, thus, a rather precise code for the conduct of the neutral states’ international relations. Specifically, neutrality concerns rights and duties of the states during the war actions, therefore expression “neutrality during war” is the tautology, and dictum “neutrality in time of peace” is nonsense. Apart from it, a definition “politics of neutrality” might be freely used for the designation of the state’s action during both, the case of war and in the peaceful times [Шевцов 2002: 7].

Nowadays neutrality is determined by three main features. Firstly, there is accordance with a type of neutrality

and certain system of international relations. Secondly, the neutral state longs to be moulded with the world community as the entity. Thirdly, the neutral state is in the spotlight of the interaction of the great powers and blocs.

Hence, each historical epoch of the international relations expects the emergence of a proper historical form of neutrality with its main international actors. The Westphalian system of the international relations since 1648 up until the World War I was characterized by the “balance of power”. The emergence of the nation-states as the main actors in the international system marked a qualitatively new period in the entire history of humankind. The role that states began to play was inherently ambivalent. On the one hand, the state could be seen as the vehicle for the widespread of economic and technological progress, but on the other hand, it could be presented as the main source of violence, terror, and repression, and as a fundamental barrier to the ultimate unification of the world.

Thomas Hobbes was the first to draw his conclusion that the international system, whereby states exist in a permanent struggle against one another for survival and nationals refer to their sovereign for protection against foreign threats, is anarchic and lead to the inescapable and universal danger [Tuck 1992: 195]. Similarly, another prominent realist of an earlier century, Niccolo Machiavelli claimed that security and power are the only paramount concerns of the world. Thus, the notion of “national security”, as the requirement to maintain the survival of the nation-state emerged. With reason, states began using a variety of strategies in order to infest the concept of national security with a qualitatively new content. The security of the state within the dynastic system of the European great power gave new energy to ideas from the Renaissance about the modern state within the system of powers. Subsequent realists, debating against the supporters of Kantian and Croatian security paradigms, brought to the fore the importance of power in states’ struggles for survival [Morgenthau 1993: 10-11].

Thereafter, a vast number of scholars have debated these concepts, bringing different empirical data into the discussion in an effort to falsify the realist approach. However, the history of European wars since XVII century greatly supports Machiavelli’s and Hobbes’s national security paradigm. At that time, the strengthening of one state was considered as a potential threat to political independence, territorial integrity and sovereignty of another state. It is interestingly to note, that states considered themselves, on the one hand, as the allies, on the other hand, as belligerent sides. In order to prevent a breaking up of already ascertained balance of power by one state, which had strengthened its power, coalitions were being formed as well as preventive wars were being fought. The notion that the nation-state had started to seek security began to be emphasized.

Neorealist Kenneth Waltz claimed that the primary goal of states was not maximizing power, but rather maintaining and improving their position in the international system. He concludes that “[...]in an unorganized realm each unit’s incentive is to put itself in a position to be able to take care of itself since no one else can be counted on to do so” [Waltz 1986: 103]. Thus, since states consider their security as a paramount thing of own existence, they will do anything possible to maintain it at all hazards.

The concept of national security has traditionally included political independence and territorial integrity as values to be protected; but other values are sometimes added [Gilpin 1981: 13]. Protecting those values, nation-states relied heavily on military power, combined with various other adopted means and strategies, as one of the most important tools for defending their national security against a variety of threats [Baldwin 1997: 29]. As Waltz puts it, “[...]because some states may at any time use force, all states must be prepared to do so – or live at the mercy of their militarily more vigorous neighbours [Waltz 1986: 98]”. However, states differ considerably in terms of their capabilities, including their military strength, and some states may be unable to defend themselves against a potential threat. Therefore, in an anarchical international system, states balance power against stronger potential opponents [Jervis 1978: 172]. Stephen Walt in his *The Origins of Alliances* describes two primary strategies-“balancing behaviour” and “bandwagoning”, which states use when joining an alliance [Walt 1985: 5-8]. A state practicing a balancing behaviour strategy will tend to align with other weak states to form a greater force against a more powerful eventual threat, whereas, the bandwagoning strategy, when practiced, means aligning with the threatening actor to avoid being attacked and tends to switch the possibility of becoming a victim with that of being an ally. Another reason for the bandwagon, even when a state is not being threatened, might be to join the more powerful side in a confrontation so as to share in the achievement of an expected victory. Sometimes as Efraim Karsh concludes, the option a state chooses may not reflect its real intentions, for instance, in cases where the state has no potential allies and is in the proximity of a more powerful actor [Karsh 1988: 81-82] or, like another researcher Stephen R. David notes, is facing powerful internal threats [David 1991: 235-238]. In those situations, a state may have no choice but to bandwagon.

However, the way wars began to be fought and high stakes in the case when the war is lost, forced certain states to break out of the encirclement and, thus, acquiring a permanent neutral status as a strategy to maintain a national security. In this respect, for great powers in a hostile anarchic realist world, maintaining

neutrality appeared to be a matter of costs and benefits, then, for small states, taking into consideration the unequal distribution of capabilities, neutrality was rather a question of survival. For small states especially, as it was already mentioned, the traditional balance-of-power theory suggests that they will seek to align with one of the rival actors so as to obtain the protectorate of the common allied power in any eventual war. But because as small states according to Robert Jervis are sometimes afraid of being influenced by their stronger allies or are unwilling to make concessions that may not serve their national interests, some of those states may want to adopt a status of neutrality [Jervis 1978: 172]. In contrast to the balance of power theory, the traditional concept of neutrality suggests that adopters prefer to rely on “non-alignment means” – such as their own deterrent recourses, effective diplomacy, and the existing rivalry between the belligerents – rather than count on more powerful allies. Because such positioning exposes the vulnerability of the neutral state to all the possible belligerents at the same time, its continued use of the neutrality strategy rests on its ability to assure the outside camps of the reliability of its neutrality.

Historically, the concept of neutrality, like alliance formation, was embraced by various states at times in ad hoc terms. The rights and duties of belligerent and neutral states were codified in the first and the second peace conferences of The Hague in 1899 and 1907 in agreements concerning neutral countries’ and persons’ rights and duties in war [Subedi 1993: 248]. The neutral shall be impartial: it shall not support the belligerents’ military efforts in any way, such as allowing one of them to use its territory. Otherwise, a neutrals’ failure to fulfil its obligations shall be considered both an internal violation of its neutrality and a violation of international law. Generalized neutral states’ rights and duties are shown in table 1.

Table 1

Neutral states’ rights and duties

| Rights | Duties |
|--|---|
| To prevent country from exploiting its territory that is sea, land, or air for military purposes | Not to be in war with any of the belligerent states and not to support them in any possible way |
| To protect neutrality from violations | |

However, certain states, consciously or not, allow one or both of the belligerents to use their territory as a springboard for further offensives, and not always their actions are qualified as a violation of international law, that is an implicit agreement of Ukraine in 2008 to allow Russia to deploy certain warships of its Black Sea Fleet that stationed in the Ukrainian port of Sevastopol against Georgia. This is one more argument that the belligerent countries sometimes unilaterally or bilaterally themselves

violate the principle of the respect of the neutral’s integrity, particularly in this case neutrality in sea war: and their duty, which is to keep the neutrals out of the war. Since there is no guaranty that belligerent states will respect international law in respect to neutral states, the latter, in attempting to maintain the status quo, must convince belligerents of the credibility of their permanent neutral status. In other words, a policy of “[...] permanent neutrality may be defined as a policy of consistent non-alignment in peacetime, overtly aimed at preparing the ground for neutrality in wartime” [Jervis 1978: 27]. It rests on the credibility of a state’s neutral intentions both during peace and during a war. To achieve such a credibility level, the neutral state has a number of options, which are classified as either positive or negative component of its neutral strategy.

The positive component includes the neutral state’s ability to persuade belligerent parties of the advantages they may gain from the state’s neutrality. This capability rests, in turn, on the neutral state’s ability to illustrate a different context of possible trade-offs, maximizing the costs to the belligerents of violating neutrality over the benefits from supporting the status quo. To convince belligerents that their neutrality has a mutual value, neutral states may offer so-called tertiary services that the rival parties cannot get otherwise from other non-neutral countries. These services might include conciliation and meditation activities for the fighting camps, various forms of humanitarian assistance, or other technical services [Karsh 1988: 179]. Swiss neutrality during World War II sets a good example. In spite of the fact that Nazi Germany had worked out the instructions for the offensive against Switzerland, its neutrality was never violated due to the fact that Switzerland had been considered a key and pivotal manufacturer of certain units for high-accuracy weapons.

The negative component of neutrality includes certain methods to deter belligerents from violating a state’s neutral privileges by, for example, showing the disproportionality between the costs and the benefits. Like the positive component, the negative one also intends to prevent the belligerents from violating states’ neutrality. But if the positive component means political, diplomatic, and humanitarian means, the negative component may also include maximizing internal defensive resources, especially military capabilities [Neuhold 1989: 90].

The negative component of neutrality is characterized by offensive and defensive strategies. The offensive strategy, of the negative neutrality component, includes striking at belligerents’ weak points, usually domestically, but not in a military manner. The defensive strategy, of the negative component, includes direct deterrence of threatening actors by building military capabilities and infrastructure that show that a neutral state is prepared and willing to protect itself, thereby persuading potential aggressors that the costs of an eventual violation will be high. Using this strategy does not mean that the neutral state hopes to actually defeat

the aggressor. It is rather a means to maximize the opponent's war costs.

Therefore, the following question arises: by what kind of means so-called neutral and non-aligned state is going to protect its neutrality from violations, if military means are no longer considered important?

One can argue that country pursues the policy of so-called status quo state, and any show of willingness to take up arms and strength its own defence might be considered hostile act by potential aggressors. Theoretically, it sounds convincing, though realities show somewhat different understanding of what does status quo indeed mean for a neutral state.

In theory, every state has the right to adopt a neutral status; there are a number of important factors that may influence that decision. As already discussed, there is always a possibility that greedy, expansionist countries will seek to exploit others for strategic and economic profit. It appears, therefore, that the more strategic a state is, the more vulnerable it is to potential danger. A peripheral country that values its current position in the international system and has no incentive for change could easily choose a neutral status. Being far from any great powers, it is not of strategic interest to rival states. And even if it is, its distance constitutes an increased cost for belligerents and makes it less likely that they will attempt to conquer it. There is one exception to this general rule, however. States that are peripheral but neighbor a more powerful actor are completely at its mercy. These so-called rimstates' security policies necessarily depend on their strong neighbors' policies and intentions. Thus, they may be tempted to bandwagon with their neighbor in order to avoid confrontation [Karsh 1988: 81-82]. But if the rimstate is able to persuade its powerful neighbor of the importance of its neutrality, the neighbor is more likely to support that neutrality's continuance. The good example of this is Finland. A day of the German attack against the Soviet Union, on June 22, 1941, the Finns had nothing left, but to declare a neutral status. Nevertheless, Finland was not able to persuade its powerful neighbor, the Soviet Union, of the importance of its neutrality that, later on, allowed on June 25, the Soviet Union launched a massive air raid against 18 Finnish towns and villages [Фітьо, Соломонюк, & Мазур: 2010].

Isolated, strategically unimportant states have a better chance to maintain their neutrality whereas the so-called buffer states are the most threatened. A buffer state is one that is situated between two major potential rivals. And whereas during peacetime potential belligerents might avoid confrontation and be mutually interested in maintaining a buffer state's neutrality, in wartime, because of its strategic importance, a buffer state has a greater chance to be exploited by either side. Moreover, the more equals the balance of power between two rivals at war, the greater the chance that buffer states will be attacked since each belligerent will try to gain control of the strategically important neutral state [Bederman

2001]. This hypothesis is supported by historical situation faced by Belgium. Having proclaimed sovereignty in 1830, Belgium declared its permanent neutrality. However, in 1914, the Germans violated Belgium's neutrality, having occupied the country under the pretext of the protection of a neutral status of Belgium against possible France's encroachment. Later on, in the beginning of World War II, Belgium neutrality was violated by the Nazis once again. So, Belgium sets an example that it is reasonable for buffer states in these circumstances, therefore, not to choose a status of neutrality, but rather should try to seek alignment with other states in peacetime and thereby avoid becoming a two-way target during a war.

In sum, status quo states may choose a neutral status to avoid being dragged into the wars of more powerful states, although conditions may not always allow them to do so. Depending on their strategic position and economic status, certain states are of great interest to belligerents and thus are more threatened than less important states. On the other hand, it is the neutral's strategic and economic strength that can support its neutrality if used wisely. Those states, which choose a neutral strategy as a means to maintain their national security, need to protect that status. And though the rights and benefits of neutral states are stipulated in international law, there is no guaranty, like it was mentioned before, that the law will always be observed. The aforementioned cases are a strong argument for this.

As the empirical data shows, Belgium's permanent neutrality and Finland's temporary neutrality, that is based on a unilateral political decision by the country itself, despite trying hard to conduct a positive neutrality strategy, these and other states could also have been dragged into the same wars if their negative component strategy had been absent.

The conclusion that we derive from this evidence is this: to protect their neutrality, states must use a combination of positive and negative neutrality component strategies, or at least have the capability to do so. This is easier to achieve when there is a certain level of interdependency between the belligerents and the neutral [Neuhold 1989: 87-89].

Moreover, like Hanspeter Neuhold puts in his another work *The European Neutrals in the 1990s. New Challenges and Opportunities* that credible neutrality requires not only taking national defence seriously, as it is the neutral country's obligation to impede military activities on its territory but also striving at economic self-sufficiency [Neuhold 1992: 233, 241]. And this aspect, beyond doubt, sometimes plays a key role in the transformation of the politics of neutrality, leading once neutrals to only refer to "soft" and narrowed form of neutrality, which is non-alignment.

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