

**UKRAINE'S FOREIGN POLICY GUIDELINES  
IN THE GEOPOLITICAL VISION OF DMYTRO ANDRIEVSKY  
(20's–30's of the XX century)**

**Taras Starodub**

Lviv Polytechnic National University

*starodyb-taras@ukr.net*

ORCID: 0000-0002-2792-1745

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The purpose of this work is to analyze Dmytro Andrievsky's geopolitical vision in terms of Ukraine's foreign policy objectives and its geopolitical positioning in both Eastern Europe and broader range of international politics. The work is carried out using the following scientific methods: method of historicism, comparative and analytical methods, and structured systems analysis.

The relevance of this topic is based on the fact that in today's international realities of the Russian military intervention in Ukraine and the struggle for actual geopolitical leadership in Eastern Europe, Dmytro Andrievsky's geopolitical vision is still relevant and demanded.

In his geopolitical vision, Andrievsky gives Ukraine the position of a regional leader of Eastern Europe and also a stable and reliable security center on the European community eastern borders against Moscow's aggressive policy. The historical assignment of Ukraine is a reliable mediator position in the political, economic and cultural relations between East and West, an integration and mobilization center for its natural neighbors in eastern Europe in shaping a common political and defensive strategy in deterring Russian aggression.

Andrievsky definitely sees Ukraine within the European Community with an international mission of an active and effective political factor, which should work intensively in order to re-establish leadership in the geopolitical space between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, and thereby establish its control and impact on international politics in the Eastern and Central Europe.

**Key words:** *international politics, geopolitics, nationalism, European community, Ukrainian state, Dmytro Andrievsky.*

**ЗОВНІШНЬОПОЛІТИЧНІ ОРІЄНТИРИ УКРАЇНИ  
У ГЕОПОЛІТИЧНИХ ВІЗІЯХ ДМИТРА АНДРІЄВСЬКОГО  
(20–30-ті рр. XX ст.)**

**Тарас Стародуб**

Національний університет “Львівська політехніка”

*starodyb-taras@ukr.net*

ORCID: 0000-0002-2792-1745

Проаналізовано геополітичні візії Дмитра Андрієвського щодо зовнішньополітичних орієнтирів України, її геополітичного позиціонування і у регіоні Східної Європи, і у масштабах широкого діапазону міжнародної політики. У своїх геополітичних візіях Д. Андрієвський надає Україні місце регіонального лідера Східної Європи, стабільного та надійного безпекового центру на східних кордонах Європейського співтовариства супроти агресивної політики Москви. Історичним призначенням України є місце надійного посередника в політичних, економічних та культурних взаємовідносинах між Сходом та Заходом, інтеграційного та мобілізаційного осередку для своїх сусідів на сході Європи у формуванні спільної політичної та оборонної стратегії у стримуванні російської агресії.

**З метою висвітлення та аналізу геополітичних візій Андрієвського використано методи історизму, порівняльно-аналітичний та структурно-системний аналізи.**

**Ключові слова:** міжнародна політика, геополітика, націоналізм, Європейське співтовариство, Українська держава, Дмитро Андрієвський.

In the interwar period of the twentieth century, the theorists and practitioners of Ukrainian nationalism, taking into account the current state of international politics and the geopolitical position of Ukraine, were able to develop rather interesting and promising geopolitical initiatives in order to create appropriate internal and foreign policy preconditions for the proclamation of the Ukrainian State, as well as to create wide international cooperation in the region of Central and Eastern Europe as a prerequisite for opposing various forms of geopolitical Russia's aggression. Among them, in today's international realities of the Russian-Ukrainian war and the struggle for actual geopolitical leadership in Eastern Europe, Dmytro Andrievsky's geopolitical vision is still relevant and demanded.

Foreign policy guidelines and geopolitical views of the theorists of Ukrainian nationalism in the 20's–30's of the 20th century were investigated by Mirchuk [Мірчук 1968], Vagan [Ваган 2016], Vyatrovych [В'ятрович 2004], Zaitsev [Зайцев 2012], Kasyanov [Касьянов 2004], Posivnych [Посівнич 2018]. However, the aforementioned authors did not investigate sufficiently holistic geopolitical visions and foreign policy orientations of Dmytro Andrievsky in the interwar period of the 20–30s of the 20th century.

*The purpose* of this work is to analyze the Dmytro Andrievsky's geopolitical visions of the subject of Ukraine's foreign policy orientations, its geopolitical positioning both in the region of Eastern Europe and broader range of international politics.

The geographic and geopolitical position of Ukraine was favorable for the Ukrainian state to fulfill a great mission in the life of the cultural nationalities from ancient times. After all, stretching out on the shores of the Black Sea, it adhered to the ways which were used to contact the centers of European civilization, to which it tried to integrate, in a cultural, civilizational and political way.

In his geopolitical visions, Dmytro Andrievsky emphasizes that Kyiv State arose thanks to the favorable geopolitical position on the path "From Varyag To Greek". Through Ukraine is a passageway from Europe through Turan to Asia, which provides great economic benefits to Kyiv. This is confirmed by the fact that at that time in Kyiv were founded large trade representative offices of European and Asian merchants. The political power of Kyiv extended to the Caucasus and the Balkans; its power was also felt on the Bosphorus coast

and in Constantinople. Yaroslav the Wise received respect and recognition among the great monarchs of Europe, as evidenced by the marriage of his daughter Anne and the king of France.

Therefore, Ukraine was preparing to become an important geopolitical factor in European cultural and economic life, but, according to D. Andrievsky, two major events that fundamentally changed the course of our history become an obstacle. The first is the Tatar intervention to Ukraine and formation of the Turkish State instead of the Byzantine Empire on the Bosphorus coast. The second is the discovery of America and loss of the Mediterranean global significance.

In the first case, the Tatars radically increased the strength and power of the Kyiv State and ravaged the Ukrainian steppes, and the old route from Europe to Asia was actually cut off just as the waterway from the North to the South along the Dnipro River was destroyed. Thus, the Black Sea, which binds Kyivan Rus with European countries: Greece, Byzantium and Italy, was in full control of the Mongols. The Ukrainian nation lost its importance to the navy state and position of connecting political, trade and cultural center between Europe and Asia, and was forced to move further north and northwest.

After the discovery of America, the importance of eastern land routes, as Asia and the Mediterranean, lost its weight and geopolitical priority to the European community. Therefore, the Black Sea, in fact, was in complete isolation and did not attract attention of the European continent and, according to Andrievsky, was "thrown away by the Mediterranean water system".

As a result of the development of such internal and external events, Ukraine was compelled to compete and maneuver and be divided between its neighbors for many times from the XV to the end of the XIX century: Moscow, Poland and Turkey. As Dmytro Andrievsky notes, in fact the discovery of America has dented the world's geopolitical significance of Ukraine and the great political, cultural and trade world movements and ways stretched around Ukraine, leaving it as a province that becomes "Borne area and the booty of the competitors, an important but inert addition to the independent factors" [Андрієвський 1928a: 316].

Obviously, the seizure of large and important geopolitical Ukrainian space by Moscow changed its external and internal policy, which by that time was oriented entirely to the East and the North. According to

Dmytro Andrievsky: "Having become a firm foot in Ukraine in the XVII century, Moscow began to go to the Caucasus, Crimea and the Balkans, initially, it wanted to reach the open, warm sea, and, having gained it, she felt a great appetite, it put her eyes on Constantinople and tried to reach the Black Sea from the South. It dreamed of the ocean, it made assaults on the Persian Gulf, and even Suez" [Андрієвський 1928b: 381].

All of that reflects the Ukrainian territory significance in the geopolitical confrontation of the East and West very well. It is evident that the current military aggression and annexation of Ukrainian territories by the Russian Federation is its attempt to restore imperial geopolitical control over Eastern and Central Europe, which gives it enormous advantages in a geopolitical confrontation with Europe and the United States. Therefore, D. Andrievsky noted that an independent Ukraine is capable of conducting an independent internal and external policy is disrupting Eurasia (Russia) and the limits of influence of the latter move from the Carpathians to the Caucasus and the Caspian. And thus, a "strong will" in the form of the Ukrainian nation appears between Moscow and Europe [Андрієвський 1928b: 381].

According to Andrievsky, independent Ukraine should become one of the main factors of European security and world politics in general, and at the same time an integration center in the East of Europe against the Eurasian North. When Ukraine can restore its geopolitical influence in East Europe, it will have no other enemy than Eurasia (Russia).

Dmytro Andrievsky definitely draws the main attention to the fact that Ukraine geopolitically and culturally belongs to European civilization: "Put on the verge of two worlds, Western and Eastern, Ukraine has its historical traditions, cultural ties and material benefits to the West and they complement each other" [Андрієвський 1930: 221].

Andrievsky in his geopolitical visions foresaw the inevitability of raising the Ukrainian issue to the European countries, with which they will meet face to face in confrontation with Bolshevism (Russia). He stressed that great danger to the European continent is in Asia. And this danger on the European borders appeared in the form of Bolshevism (Russia), which is the greatest world's problem that may become a threat of a worldwide rebellion against the civilized world. Moreover, the solution to this problem is Ukraine. In addition, according to Andrievsky, it is obvious that in resolving the Eastern European threats from Russia, Europe cannot escape the Ukrainian national-state affair.

It should also be noted that Dmytro Andrievsky, as well as a wide range of other prominent publicists and

theorists of Ukrainian nationalism were greatly influenced by Dmitry Dontsov, who constantly warned the West about the threat from Russia. Although, as Oleg Bagan observes, his warning, as well as the current criticism of many other prominent theorists of Ukrainian nationalism, went vain: "The West then, during the years of the First and Second World Wars, did not realize what is Russia as an empire, what destruction, both moral and cultural, it carries" [Баган 2016: 406].

Today it became clear for everyone that the war between Russia and Ukraine can not be indifferent to Europe, and the European community should use all its means, including all its economic potential, to put an end to Russian aggression, which poses a huge threat to European security once again, first of all concerning Baltic States, Poland and the entire Baltic-Black Sea basin.

Ukraine's geopolitical position is intended to establish clear boundaries of the European political and economic system of relations and lay security guarantees for the European West against the Asian East, and at the same time establish equal and mutually beneficial relations between these two worlds.

According to Andrievsky, independence from Moscow and political, economic and cultural integration into Europe, Ukraine is able to move the borders of Europe far to the East and the North.

For this purpose, it has all the geopolitical backgrounds: "Turned by a forehead against the eastern offence, it has the Black Sea and the whole West behind, tugging with straps to Middle Europe and the Caucasian peoples, it crosses the path of Russia to the West and to the warm sea" [Андрієвський 1930: 223]. At the same time, Ukraine has an opportunity to mobilize its natural neighbors (Caucasian nationalities, Belarus, Lithuania), whose development and national existence, according to Andrievsky, depends on the geopolitical position of Ukraine in this region.

In his geopolitical works Dmytro Andrievsky diverts Ukraine to the position of the best mediator in the relationship between Europe and Asia, the role of the natural bridge between the two opposing worlds.

Andrievsky argues that Ukraine should become "the cornerstone of a new order in East Europe". But this system must be built on the balance of forces, not on the geopolitical hegemony of Moscow and the dictation of the conditions of Poland.

The European Community should realize this and not allow geopolitical domination in this region of Moscow, depending on its "Asian messianism" and economic prosperity. At the same time, the geopolitical position of Poland does not give to it the

appropriate opportunity and the forces it has to stop the Moscow's aggressive policy. Instead, only independent Ukraine can stop Moscow's aggression in the south-eastern expanses and organize political, economic and military cooperation among the countries of the Baltic-Black Sea region.

Andrievsky warns that Poland will constantly strive to take over this historic mission of Ukraine. Therefore, in this regard, any unions with Poland are not dangerous for Ukraine. According to Andrievsky, Poland wants to become a decisive geopolitical subject in Eastern Europe, putting itself in the position of Ukraine and subordinating Ukrainians to Polish politics. And this means giving up its "birthright" and recognizing the decisive role of Poland in the East of Europe, and therefore "betraying the historic mission of Ukraine and its national idea". But Andrievsky states that: "Constrained by the two leaders, Germany and Russia, Poland must spend its strength on the struggle for existence, and for more of them it will not be enough" [Андрієвський 1931a: 165]. Actually, the whole Polish policy towards Ukraine is reduced to a desire to serve Ukrainians, but at the same time prevent the strengthening of the strength and potential of the Ukrainian nation.

According to Andrievsky, neither the public nor the governmental circles of Poland have any understanding and respect for the Ukrainian national idea and statehood, despite the fact that a strong and powerful Ukrainian state is necessary for Poland and its geopolitical security. In this context, Dmytro Andrievsky predicted the possibility of separation of Poland between Russia and Germany, "an alliance between which the fact is not yet realized, but a possibility of such an alliance exists, which is very dangerous for both Ukraine and for Europe and especially for Poland". But Poland can not understand this and falsely opposes against the Ukrainian state, despite the threat of such a position during its existence: "Poland holds the prospects of growth at the expense of Ukraine steadfastly, in which it did not succeeded in the past, and will not succeed in the future, but it can only cause the fourth breakdown" [Андрієвський 1931b: 120].

Andrievsky defined two main geopolitical opponents for the Ukrainian nation, its state and its geopolitical development – Moscow and Poland. The most dangerous for the Ukrainian state is Moscow imperialism, which tries to destroy the Ukrainian nation historically, spiritually and physically. We have already considered what historical, economic and geopolitical reasons are driving Moscow to conquer Kyiv. And in this Moscow-Ukrainian war, we must understand one truth

that for us it means "to be or not be" to the Ukrainian nation, whereas for Russians it is about their economic and geopolitical benefits in building imperial Moscow. At the same time, we should realize that in this war, our best defense is just an attack, and it should be until the "mention of the former dispersal and traditions of the Russian empire" is not taken from the memory of the Muscovites. In his work "Building the Nation" Andrievsky clearly indicates in what conditions it is possible to accomplish this task: "It is possible that the supremacy of Moscow over Kyiv can be eliminated only by the victory of Kyiv over Moscow. That is, our statehood and national existence, which depend on whether we can tame Moscow, harness it to our state carriage" [Андрієвський 2010: 82].

Poland is the second major geopolitical adversary. According to D. Andrievsky, it does not threaten our existence, although it is weakened to physically destroy us, but it becomes an obstacle to our historic mission on the path to geopolitical leadership in Eastern Europe. Therefore, we must convey to the European community that Poland's anti-Ukrainian policy is weakening the eastern front and leaves Europe open to Bolshevik (Russian) threat.

At the same time, Poland belongs to the European community, which requires us to have a foreign policy approach to fight the latter with a completely different approach than with Moscow.

In the opinion of Andrievsky, in the struggle for Moscow imperialism, Ukraine must find a good opportunity to get rid of the political "rocket" between Moscow and Warsaw and to find reliable allies outside of them. The best way for this is to integrate into the European community, in which Ukraine should become an active political factor. It should take the role of consolidating center in East of Europe among the countries of the European community, rather than stand aside, taking a neutral, expectant position.

At the same time, taking a consolidated position with Europe in confronting the Moscow threat, we should not ignore those political differences that exist in the European politics itself, but rather use them effectively to establish a rapid economic and political integration of Ukraine into the European community.

It is obvious that in the XX century interwar period there was no political unanimity in Europe and one co-produced political line, and if it were, then, as Andrievsky argued, there would be no place for an independent Ukrainian state. But this situation does not exclude the possibility of revising and changing our political position on the Ukrainian issue from the leaders of European governments in the future, which ultimately

depends also on our active and effective economic, political and military activities.

In his geopolitical works, Andrievsky emphasizes on conditions that can contribute to establishing a stable relationship in Europe. First of all, it is necessary to “remove Russia from the Balkans, this most dangerous cornerstone of the European continent”. Andrievsky also pays special attention to the solution of the German-French problem and the prevention of a probable alliance between Germany and Moscow, because “such an alliance, with the mutual complementation of the latter two countries with technology and raw materials, will not only violate the European balance but will also be fatal to Ukraine” [Андрієвський 1928b: 382].

An outstanding theoretician of Ukrainian nationalism predicted that there would be a full division of forces in Europe (which eventually took place during the Second World War), to which it was not actually prepared. For this purpose, it is necessary to rebuild the pan-European policy of relations and to establish a new political system, where the independent Ukrainian state should become the main factor of stability.

In his writings, Dmytro Andrievsky emphasizes the importance of the Ukrainian geographic position and the availability of natural resources that will play a decisive role in the indefatigacy of Europe from America. Ukraine, in its turn, has all favorable conditions to engage in a strong relationship with the West in order to develop its economic potential and make the most profitable use of its natural wealth. In this regard, D. Andrievsky puts only one condition: “Ukraine should be freed from Russia’s control so that it could grow economically and Europe could benefit from it. This is the political side of the Ukrainian cause for Europe” [Андрієвський 1930: 223].

In these circumstances, Ukrainian foreign and domestic policy should not diminish its weight in the international political game of world powers that are fighting on the “face of two worlds”. But, on the contrary, it must exhibit all its power and fluency.

In his article “The Ukrainian Case at the International Chessboard”, Andrievsky analyzed the timetable of the international forces in Europe and the grouping of the Allied countries, which in the future will determine the main direction of European politics, and at the same time emphasized on an important impact of America on the European policy.

He also noted that, as we watch the development of political events in Europe, we should establish our cooperation with those European policy makers who will have an impact on the formation of European and world politics tomorrow, rather than the European Union-condemned states. But despite the future alignment of

forces in Europe, the latter remains our ally in the geopolitical confrontation along the East-West line.

The prominent theoretician of Ukrainian nationalism emphasized that France, which, though without proper allied support, still remains the main actor of European politics, is most displeased with the Ukrainian issue. Therefore, we need to establish a dialogue with the French side and its allies to find a common language with them.

On the other hand, a positive attitude towards the Ukrainian issue of England, Italy, the Czech Republic and Germany can have not only positive consequences for our liberation struggle, but also will contribute to the fact that France and even Poland will be forced to have a greater understanding of our issue. Dmitry Andrievsky argues that: “The discrepancy and even the contradictory nature of the struggles of these wars in the field of Eastern Europe may well be ours. Because they will inevitably push each other towards supporting our cause, albeit in a different way” [Андрієвський 1931: 264].

In general, according to Dmytro Andrievsky, the most opposed to the nationalist movement, according to Nikolai Posivnych, USSR, Poland and Romania, France and Yugoslavia are reluctant to do so, while the Baltic States are the biggest sympathizers. He considers Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria to be neutral. The author defines Germany, Italy, Japan, England and the United States as allies seeking to use the Ukrainian issue in world politics in their own interests [Посівнич 2018].

Therefore, Ukrainians should make effort to use temporary disagreements in European politics and to solve their national-state issue.

So, in his geopolitical vision, Andrievsky gives Ukraine the position of a regional leader of Eastern Europe, a stable and reliable security center on the eastern borders of the European community against Moscow’s aggressive policy. The historic destination of Ukraine is the place of a reliable mediator in the political, economic and cultural relations between East and West, an integration and mobilization center for its natural neighbors in eastern Europe in shaping a common political and defensive strategy in deterring Russian aggression.

Andrievsky identified two main historical geopolitical opponents of Ukraine – Russia and Poland. Ukraine should be in a state of constant military readiness towards Moscow in order to preserve its leadership in the east of Europe, on which our “to be or not to be” depends on. Only a strong position of Kyiv may stop Moscow. At the same time, Europe should make effort to weaken Moscow’s aggressive policy towards Kyiv, using all the means available to it to support Ukrainian

geopolitics in the region, which the European Union's security policy on the East depends on.

Andrievsky's geopolitical vision in relation to Poland may seem obsolete and irrelevant to the present, as they were written in the realities of the XX century interwar period. But the latest political and diplomatic incidents in Warsaw towards Kyiv, within the unannounced "historical war", show quite opposite things. Therefore, Andrievsky's geopolitical curtailment of Polish politics does not have to be completely discarded, because they remain relevant to the present.

Andrievsky sees Ukraine clearly within the European Community with an international mission of an active and effective political factor in shaping Eastern Europe. But the long-term security and geopolitical prospect of Ukraine as a regional leader on the eastern and western borders depends on how Ukrainians will be able to accept the challenges of international politics. In the current international realities, the Ukrainian state still needs to concentrate its attention on intensifying the establishment of cooperation with the countries of the Caucasus. After all, the countries of the Caucasus and the Transcaucasia are natural allies of Ukraine in its geopolitical strategy of asserting its positions in the whole Black Sea area, which, at the same time, neutralize Russia's attempts to extend its geopolitical activity there. Ukraine certainly should not forget about the geopolitical challenges of its western neighbors (Poland, Hungary), whose aggressive policies against Ukraine cast doubt on the consolidation processes in the geopolitical cooperation between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. However, despite this, the Ukrainian state should continue the intensive efforts to resume leadership in the geopolitical space between the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea, thus establishing its control and influence on international politics in Eastern and Central Europe.

Ukraine's definition of its foreign policy priorities in the context of the active transformation of the modern system of international relations determines the prospect of further research into the views of the theorists and practitioners of Ukrainian nationalism on foreign policy issues.

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