The aim of this article is to offer an analysis of early Russell’s theories of acquaintance and description. He tried to offer a solution to the Meinong’s problem of non-existent entities, and used formal logic to develop a theory of definite descriptions which was related to the epistemological principle of acquaintance. I agree to the view that the historical Russell changed some of his views, but the principle of acquaintance remained “the structural core” in his philosophy.
My aim in this paper is to offer a historical reconstruction of two alternative theories about truth and predication starting from the topic of non-existent entities. Following Brentano, Twardowski has developed, just as Husserl and Meinong did, a theory of intentionality based on the assumption that in a presentation the idea (the content) from the mind is related to its object by the so-called “intentional nexus” (this expression was proposed by Grossmann) without an ontological commitment regarding the existence of the object.