Euroscepticism 's Impact upon European Union's Foreing Policy (Research Article)

2020;
: 8-14
https://doi.org/10.23939/shv2020.02.008
Received: May 06, 2020
Accepted: October 11, 2020
Authors:
1
National University Ostroh Academy

In the article, the author overviews and analyzes the  impact of Euroscepticism on EU foreign policy. In particular, we identify the key actors involved in implementing the European common foreign policy and level of their affiliation with the ideas  of Euroscepticism. EU Commissioners,  the High Representative  of  the Union  for Foreign Affairs  and Security Policy and  the  staff  of  the European External Action  Service  are  not  eurosceptic. However,  they  do  not  have sufficient political  influence decision making process. Thus,  the European Council  faces some obstacles achieving a compromise on international relations' issues. The European Parliament is more dependent on the Member States. Positions of the Member States  are  also  different.  The  countries  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  have  a  much  higher level  of  opposition  to strengthening  internal  integration  in  foreign policy, but  they  support EU  enlargement. The Nordic countries  support  the deepening of foreign policy cooperation but are wary of the accession of new members. Therefore, the biggest opposition to the common foreign policy observed in the EU member states. Under the influence of Eurosceptic ideas, they slow down the process of  integration. The population  supports  the common foreign policy with hopes  to resolve  the migration problem. Besides,  citizens  believe  that  common  foreign  policy  can prevent  the economic  intervention  of  third  countries. Excessive interference  in  the EU by Russia, China  and  the United States  is also an obstacle  to deepening  integration. Despite  this, European  officials  and  citizens of EU member  states  support of  strengthening  cooperation  in  this  area. To  sum up,  it is difficult to realise a common foreign policy without decreasing level of eurosceptism. 

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