New challenges for exploitation of continuously operating reference GNSS stations during hostilities. Case study of Ukraine

Department of Higher Geodesy and Astronomy of Lviv Polytechnic National University
Lviv Polytechnic National University
Lviv Polytechnic National University
Lviv Polytechnic National University
Lviv Polytechnic National University
Lviv Polytechnic National University

The study presents the current state of GNSS Continuously Operating Reference Stations (CORS) networks and their operational characteristics during the ongoing hostilities in Ukraine. Stable GNSS CORS network operation is crucial not only for agricultural, geodetic, and land management tasks but also for military navigation and topography. The aim of this work is to analyze the impact of hostilities in Ukraine's GNSS network, considering factors like temporary occupation of certain territories, power outages due to missile strikes on energy infrastructure, and GNSS signal jamming using radio-electronic methods in front-line regions. Another objective of this study is to highlight examples of incorrect RTK or VRS operation due to potential errors from radio-electronic jamming or GPS spoofing as well as to provide practical recommendations for surveyors. As a result, the research has analyzed changes in the number of properly functioning GNSS stations from 2021 to 2023 using the GeoTerrace and System.NET networks. These networks cover all regions of Ukraine except the temporarily occupied territories by russia. Daily processing of RINEX files with a sampling interval of 30 seconds from CORS GNSS stations was conducted using the Bernese GNSS v.5.2 software package over three years. It was noted that following the large-scale invasion in February 2022 and through the spring of that year, there was a sharp reduction of about 10% in the number of properly functioning active GNSS stations. Scientific novelty and practical importance. The article presents practical recommendations for users, such as surveyors and land managers, performing GNSS measurements in RTK or VRS modes using permanent stations, to assess the influence of radio-electronic jamming or GPS spoofing on observations. CORS network assessment and daily calculated coordinates of GNSS stations from 2021 to 2023 can be used for future geodynamic research in the region.

  1. Dach, R., Lutz, S., Walser, P., & Fridez, P. (2015). Bernese GNSS software version 5.2.
  2. De Wilde, W., Sleewaegen, J. M., Bougard, B., Cuypers, G., Popugaev, A., Landmann, M., ... & Granados, G. S. (2018, September). Authentication by polarization: A powerful anti-spoofing method. In Proceedings of the 31st International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of the Institute of Navigation (ION GNSS+ 2018) (pp. 3643-3658) URL:
  3. EUREF Permanent GNSS Network. URL: (дата звернення: 01.03.2024).
  4. Goward, Dana A. (July 11, 2017). "Mass GPS Spoofing Attack in Black Sea?". The Maritime Executive. An apparent mass and blatant, GPS spoofing attack involving over 20 vessels in the Black Sea last month has navigation experts and maritime executives scratching their heads. URL;
  5. International GNSS Service. URL: (дата звернення: 01.03.2024).
  6. Ishchenko M.V (2009). Review of permanent GNSS-stations networks. Astronomical School’s Report. 6 (9), 114-117. URL: (In Ukrainian).
  7. Khoda, O. (2024). Propagation of the IGb14 Reference Frame on the Territory of Ukraine Based on Results of the Analysis of GNSS Observations for GPS Weeks 2106–2237. Kinematics and Physics of Celestial Bodies, 40(1), 47-53.
  8. Khoda, O., & Ishchenko, M. (2021). Rapid daily processing of observation data at the Ukrainian permanent GNSS stations for monitoring of their stability. In International Conference of Young Professionals «GeoTerrace-2021» (Vol. 2021, No. 1, pp. 1-5). European Association of Geoscientists & Engineers.
  9. Lundberg, E., & Michael, I. (2018). Novel Timing Antennas for Improved GNSS Resilience. In Proceedings of the 49th Annual Precise Time and Time Interval Systems and Applications Meeting  45-58.
  10. Meng L, Yang L, Yang W, Zhang L. (2022) A Survey of GNSS Spoofing and Anti-Spoofing Technology. Remote Sensing. 14(19):4826.
  11. Novikova, O., Palamar, A., & Petkov, S. (2020, April). Operator service of GNSS networks of Ukraine. In The 12 th International scientific and practical conference «Impact of modernity on science and practice», Edmonton, Canada. URL: (In Ukrainian)
  12. Poisel, R. (2011). Modern communications jamming principles and techniques. Artech house. URL:
  13. Psiaki, M. L., & Humphreys, T. E. (2016). GNSS spoofing and detection. Proceedings of the IEEE104(6), 1258-1270.
  14. Savchuk S. Practical aspects of the application of the new USK2000 reference system. International scientific and practical conference GEOFORUM-2012. – Lviv-Yavoriv, Ukraine. URL: (In Ukrainian)
  15. Skolnik, M. I. (1980). Introduction to radar systems (Vol. 3, pp. 81-92). New York: McGraw-hill. URL:
  16. Tretyak K., & Brusak I. (2022) Modern deformations of Earth crust of territory of Western Ukraine based on «GEOTERRACE» GNSS network data. Geodynamics, 32(1), 16-25.
  17. Tretyak, K., Korliatovych, T., Brusak, I., (2021). Applying the statistical method of GNSS time series analysis for the detection of vertical displacements of Dnister HPP-1 dam. In International Conference of Young Professionals «GeoTerrace-2021». European Association of Geoscientists & Engineers. DOI: 10.3997/2214-4609.20215K3012
  18. Tretyak, K., Zayats, O., Hlotov V., Navodych M., & Brusak, I. (2022). Establishment of the automated system of geodetic monitoring for structures of Tereble-Ritska HPP. Geodesy, Cartography, and Aerial Photography, 95(1), 13-21.
  19. Ukrainian GNSS network (n.d.) Main Astronomical Observatory of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. Retrieved 01.03.2024, from: