Institutionalization of parliamentary opposition rights in Central and Eastern European countries

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Kovalchuk V., Sofinska I.
"Institutionalization of parliamentary opposition rights in Central and Eastern European countries"

Lviv Polytechnic National University, Institute of Jurisprudence and Psychology
Ukrainian Catholic University

The subject of our article is not the political opposition in general, which is often heterogeneous in ideological beliefs and means and methods of gaining power. Still, as a legal, political force that is constructive towards the government, the parliamentary opposition pursues its program goals according to established procedure. This article uses the experience of legal regulation and functioning of the parliamentary opposition in Central and Eastern European countries like Czechia, Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine. In legal tradition and culture, the institutional aspect of the parliamentary opposition in these European Union border member states is more similar to Ukraine than others. At the same time, each of these researched countries has its own positive and negative experience in finding a precise balance between the parliamentary minority (opposition) and the pro-government majority, which is essential for each democratic country in terms of further state-building, policy, and law- making practice.
The parliamentary opposition should have the opportunity to amend the bills proposed by the majority without hindrance. To this end, it is necessary to regulate the initiatives of pro- government parliamentary factions to adopt bills under the accelerated procedure, particularly when handling critical aspects of a political or legal nature. In Central and Eastern European countries and Ukraine, most parliamentary opposition rights are non- institutionalized; this practice has not become widespread. There are no reserved seats on committees for the parliamentary minority. They participate in the distribution of leadership positions in parliamentary structures on a proportional basis in the status of ordinary clubs and groups.

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