The article deals with the peculiarities of demand and the justification of the functioning of the national telethon «The only news (Yedyni Novyny)» in the second year of the RussianUkrainian war through the prism of the preferences of the young audience. Attention is focused on the main arguments of criticism of the national telethon and compared with real threats and challenges. The main argument against preserving the single format of the telethon is the presentation of one-sided information and the low level of compliance with journalistic standards, in particular regarding the balanced presentation of information. Involvement of the same speakers, lack of variety of content presentation leads to the fact that the marathon becomes uninteresting for viewers. There is another, no less important argument against the preservation of a single telethon. According to some respondents, the telethon has turned into a PR platform for pro-government political forces and does not provide an opportunity for alternative politicians and experts to participate in the debate. Alternative politicians and experts are not allowed to participate. At the same time, journalists fear that the format of a single telethon may lead to the elimination of alternative sources of information. Theoretical, empirical and sociological research methods were used to conduct this study. Among the theoretical ones are the analysis of documents that regulate media activities, the drafting of legislative acts that relate to the specifics of the functioning of various spheres during the war, a review of the works of Ukrainian and foreign researchers. Empirical methods include content analysis, which was applied to highlight the main topics covered in the National telethon «The only news» in the second year of the war. The content analysis was carried out by watching the broadcasts of TV channels every Friday from December 2023 to January 2024. The survey as a sociological method of information gathering was applied to study the attitude of the young audience to the national telethon «The only news» during the war.
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