: 80-88
Vasyl Stus’ Donetsk National University

The issue of spreading pro-Russian propaganda in the most popular telegram channels of Odesa region is considered in the paper. It is established that in scientific discourse there are practically no studies on this topic. The most studied problems are: the spread of propaganda in the Telegram by international terrorist groups (ISIS, Alkaida), as well as the blocking of this network in Russia and other authoritarian states. Meanwhile, monitoring of professional media organizations in Ukraine, both at the national and regional levels, has shown that the Telegram is very often used in order to spread pro-Russian messages.

An algorithm for detecting pro-Russian messages in the Telegram was developed and the results of its work were demonstrated. The three most popular channels of Odesa region were monitored: “X… Odessa” (265 thousand subscribers), “Odessa Info” (191 thousand) and “Odessa as it is” (126 thousand) in the fall of 2021. Automatic content analysis and frame analysis are used as research methods. It is determined that the Telegram channel “X… Odessa” most often uses the frame “inconvenience”, telling locals about the obstacles experienced by citizens through reforms of decommunization and “language” law (1.07), while Russian aggression was exploited only in every second post – (0.52). Telegram channels “Odessa Info” and “Odessa as it is” wrote about Russian aggression more often – (1.46 and 0.79), and about “inconveniences” less often – (0.73; 0.64). It is suggested that in further research on the detection of propaganda, the greatest attention should be paid to posts where only the “inconvenience” frame occurs. Such texts were found in all three telegram channels. Two pro-Russian narratives were identified: the “separateness” of Odessa from Ukraine, and the “persecution” of Russian-speakers in Ukraine. It is determined that in further research the proposed algorithm for detecting pro-Russian propaganda can be used for Telegram channels of other regions, as well as for all-Ukrainian channels

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